Political uncertainty and international corruption

Rajeev Goel and James Saunoris

Applied Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 24, issue 18, 1298-1306

Abstract: This article uniquely considers influences of political uncertainty on corruption. Political uncertainty disturbs existing corrupt (and legal) contractual relations inducing greater corrupt activity to strengthen existing alliances and foster new ones. Results across two measures of cross-national corruption show that political assassinations increase corruption in different variations and time periods, and a general index of political instability mostly has the same effect. The influences of other factors on corruption are in general accord with the literature. These findings are generally robust to consideration of alternate dimensions of political uncertainty.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2016.1273480

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