The (in) effectiveness of procurement auctions in the public sector

Yizhaq Minchuk and Shlomo Mizrahi

Applied Economics Letters, 2017, vol. 24, issue 4, 247-249

Abstract: This article studies procurement auctions in the public sector using game theoretical tools. The article shows that when participants in an auction are agents with low abilities (low type), as is common in the public sector, they place the same contract request. As a result, the auction mechanism will rarely produce real competition, thus making this mechanism, which limits bidders to those already within the system, ineffective for use in the public sector job market.

Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2016.1181704 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:24:y:2017:i:4:p:247-249

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2016.1181704

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().