Campaigning and election outcomes in a presidential primary election
Applied Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 25, issue 10, 713-717
This article presents new evidence from the US presidential primary setting on the role campaigning plays in determining election outcomes. Using candidate visits as a measure of campaign intensity, I estimate a discrete choice model of voting using a differentiated products framework where I allow for abstention and create instruments for campaigning based on Democratic Party rules for delegate allocation. On average, a visit by a candidate increases the vote share of this candidate by about 2.4 percentage points and decreases the abstaining share by 0.7 percentage points.
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