Conflicted financial advice: disclosure revisited

Paul Chen and Martin Richardson

Applied Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 25, issue 12, 826-829

Abstract: We examine the impact of disclosing an advisor’s conflict of interest in providing financial advice to a client in an experiment. We find that an advisor’s conflict of interest harms the client and that disclosing the conflict harms the advisor. Unlike earlier literature, we do not find that disclosure of the advisor’s conflict of interest results in moral licensing or strategic exaggeration behaviour by the advisor nor, relatedly, that disclosure disadvantages the client.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2017.1368984

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