Excluded coalitions and the 2013 German federal election

Tobias Hiller

Applied Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 25, issue 13, 936-940

Abstract: In a recent article, Hiller introduced a value for cooperative games considering that players exclude coalitions with other players – the $$\rm EC$$EC value (excluded coalitions value). One reason for developing the $$\rm EC$$EC value was to improve the analysis of parliaments, since prior to elections, parties issue coalition statements and exclude cooperation with parties. In this article, we use the $$\rm EC$$EC value to analyse the influence of coalition statements on the bargaining strength of the parties after the 2013 German federal election. More specifically, we calculate the distribution of power in German government coalitions that were possible with respect to the opinion polls in the time prior to the election.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2017.1386275

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