One-sided provision of a public good through bargaining under representative democracy

Ryusuke Shinohara

Applied Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 25, issue 3, 162-166

Abstract: We examine a trade-off between strategic delegation and the internalization of interregional externalities through bargaining in the context of political economy. We show that in the case of one-sided provision of a public good, if the public good produced by one region generates a sufficiently significant spillover to another region, then interregional negotiation increases the total surplus of the entire economy.

Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2017.1305084

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