When lack of accountability allows observing unobservables: moral hazard in sub-national government credit markets in Mexico

Fausto Hernandez-Trillo

Applied Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 25, issue 5, 326-330

Abstract: This article estimates the amount of moral hazard effect in sub-national credit markets. I employ the case of Mexico because of the country’s lack of political accountability; a fact that I argue allows for observation of this informational problem. In particular, out of every dollar borrowed, sub-national governments spend 45 cents in activities unrelated to the purpose of credit.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2017.1321828 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:25:y:2018:i:5:p:326-330

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2017.1321828

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().