Are there inherent biases in applying cost–benefit analysis?
Kenneth J. Button and
Johan Eklund ()
Applied Economics Letters, 2018, vol. 25, issue 7, 461-464
This article extends discussions of potential biases that can exist in applying cost–benefit analysis. While there is extensive evidence that capture can result in stakeholder manipulation of inputs, there are also claims that the analysis is inherently theoretically bias in favour of over acceptance. The article shows that, contrary to these latter claims, treating projects in isolation is unlikely to produce such bias; indeed, it is as likely as not to lead to suboptimally low acceptance rates. The reason for excessive acceptance of projects therefore is largely due to institutional capture of the analysis for either self-interest or natural human over-optimism.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:25:y:2018:i:7:p:461-464
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips
More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().