Cooperative choice of corporate social responsibility in a bilateral monopoly model

Yasunori Ouchida ()

Applied Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 26, issue 10, 799-806

Abstract: This article presents an examination of a linear bilateral monopoly model with endogenous and cooperative choice of corporate social responsibility (CSR) level. This article also describes an investigation of the effects of cooperative choice of CSR on the market and welfare. New findings are explicit derivation of the necessary and sufficient condition for solving a double marginalization problem in the bilateral monopoly model with CSR. In addition, this report is the first demonstrating that cooperative CSR with Nash bargaining improves consumer surplus, social welfare and each firm’s profit to a level higher than that achieved through noncooperative CSR. Furthermore, cooperative CSR with Nash bargaining is shown to be capable of completely solving the double marginalization problem generated by a bilateral monopoly, although the manufacturer and the retailer are not vertically integrated.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1497843

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