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Party-crashers or wallflowers? The lack of strategic voting in experimental primaries

Calvin Blackwell () and Peter Calcagno ()

Applied Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 26, issue 19, 1641-1648

Abstract: Open and semi-open primaries allow members of opposing political parties to participate in the selection of candidates for the general election. This feature has led to the claim that partisans will ‘cross-over’ and vote in the rival party’s primary, thereby sabotaging that party’s selection process. Using an experimental election, in which it is costly to vote, we find that most voters vote sincerely or not at all, and find little evidence of strategic voting.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2019.1591585

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