Overpayment to directors and future operating performance

Jin-Ying Wang

Applied Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 26, issue 1, 1-4

Abstract: This article derives the predicted excess compensation from corporate governance variables and explores the impact of director excessive compensation on future operating performance. By using the data in Taiwan as the research samples, this article finds that overpayment to directors will decrease the future operating performance of the firm. The results are consistent, regardless of analysing in the form of fixed compensation or performance-based compensation.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1430329

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