The powerless yet relevant third: a three-player ultimatum/dictator game with earned funds and roles

Jason Childs and Alexander Siebert

Applied Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 26, issue 2, 147-151

Abstract: We report the first experiment to pair a three-player ultimatum/dictator game with a real effort task. The inclusion of the real effort task shifts the standard for division from simple egalitarianism towards relative performance; even in treatments in which roles and funds are exogenous. Additionally, we find proposers overcompensate themselves relative to their effort, and this additional compensation comes at the expense of powerless (third) players. Individual characteristics predict the nature of a proposals. Lastly, we find that responders’ choice to accept is based on their own and the powerless third party’s compensation.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1441503

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