Do two bribe less than one? – An experimental study on the four-eyes-principle

Anja Bodenschatz and Bernd Irlenbusch

Applied Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 26, issue 3, 191-195

Abstract: We incorporate a four-eyes-mechanism on the briber’s side into a bribery game. Our results are mixed. We find no effect of the mechanism in a one-shot setting, but a reduction of bribes when the setting is repeated.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1456644

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