Opportunistic shirking behaviour during unpaid overtime

Michael J. Lopez and Brian Mills

Applied Economics Letters, 2019, vol. 26, issue 7, 608-612

Abstract: We identify the presence of shirking by Major League Baseball umpires during indefinite unpaid overtime, as defined by extra innings. In the presence of new information about expected game length, umpires exert biases in ball and strike calls consistent with opportunistically reducing the likelihood of working additional time. General implications with respect to the effectiveness of salaried workers during unpaid overtime hours are discussed.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2018.1488048

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