Costly information acquisition and public disclosure: implications for investor welfare

Binbin Chen, Shancun Liu and Qiang Zhang

Applied Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 27, issue 11, 880-885

Abstract: We explore the combined impacts of costly information acquisition and public disclosure for investors. When there are only outsiders in the market, disclosure with low public information precision is beneficial to them because they can obtain more return by thoroughly utilizing the market-making capacity. When insiders and outsiders coexist in the market, the increase of information cost or disclosed-information precision can improve their welfare by reducing adverse selection risk. When all investors are insiders, reducing information acquisition cost is efficient for welfare improvement.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2019.1646856

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