Tax compliance and wealth inequality

Adriana Alventosa and Gonzalo Olcina ()

Applied Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 27, issue 11, 899-903

Abstract: In this work, we theoretically approach optimal taxing in a public good provision context in a society where wealth is Pareto distributed. Our main result shows that high levels of wealth inequality yield lower levels of tax compliance and, consequently, lower provision of public goods.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2019.1646859

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