CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives and earnings guidance

Tianqi Jiang, Zhao Wang, Shingo Goto and Fan Zhang

Applied Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 27, issue 15, 1256-1259

Abstract: Extending recent studies on chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs), we investigate the impact of CEO and CFO risk-taking incentives on earnings guidance. We find that firms with high CEO risk-taking incentives are more likely to issue earnings guidance and issue more guidance. We also find that firms with high CFO risk-taking incentives are associated with less precise guidance, narrower forecast range, and earlier forecasts.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2019.1676865

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