Overcapacity investment and supervision fluctuation: an evolutionary game approach

Yingying Ma, Zaixu Zhang, Jaejin Jang and Jie Qu

Applied Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 27, issue 3, 221-227

Abstract: The production enterprise’s capacity overinvestment and governmental supervision failure often lead to overcapacity. The article builds an evolutionary game model between supervision agencies and production enterprises to explain the supervision fluctuation of overcapacity problem. The analytical solutions are found. Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the evolutionary game process with Dynamo and Matlab. In the long-run, the initial condition and the payoffs are two main factors determine the probability of failed supervision. Apart from single punishment measure, more effective measures need to be taken to address overcapacity efficiently.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2019.1613486 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:27:y:2020:i:3:p:221-227

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2019.1613486

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().