The US trade dispute: blunt offense or rational strategy?

Michael Hübler and Axel Herdecke

Applied Economics Letters, 2020, vol. 27, issue 9, 690-696

Abstract: This article evaluates the recent protectionist US trade policy and the retaliation of the EU and China. The article employs a New Quantitative Trade Theory model and an Armington model for comparison. The simulation results show that US car tariffs are a credible threat to the EU, but the steel and aluminum tariffs are not. China suffers considerably from the US tariffs, especially the latest extended, tightened tariffs. The retaliation measures of the EU and China, however, do not cause significant US welfare losses compared to the situation without mutual trade policy.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2019.1644428

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