Self-serving bias across strategic and non-strategic dictator games with production

David Kingsley and Michael Ciuchta

Applied Economics Letters, 2021, vol. 28, issue 13, 1082-1086

Abstract: This paper investigates behaviour across strategic and non-strategic dictator games with a preceding production phase. In both treatments subjects remain paired and play a trust game immediately following the dictator game. In the strategic condition subjects are informed about the subsequent trust game, while in the non-strategic condition they are not. Dictators in our non-strategic condition display a self-serving bias. On the other hand, dictators in our strategic condition are more generous and display no self-serving bias. Despite the increased generosity, transfers and earnings in the trust game are lower in the strategic condition. Results suggest that generosity, perceived as having a strategic motivation, can undermine trust.

Date: 2021
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2020.1798338

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