Independent directors’ dissent on boards and detection of firm violations: empirical evidence from China

Qingqing Fei

Applied Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 29, issue 2, 167-172

Abstract: Using a bivariate probit model that addresses partial observability, I find a positive relationship between independent directors’ dissent on boards and firm violation detection, implying the positive effect of dissent on triggering investigations that bring violations to light. The results provide evidence of a specific channel for independent directors to influence the detection of firm violations and, taking a broader view, to improve corporate governance.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2020.1861189

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