A penalty-reward system for pro-environmental project execution

Avinash Kumar Singh and Kampan Mukherjee

Applied Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 29, issue 6, 477-483

Abstract: In this paper, an evolutionary game was developed and used to simulate interactions among the key stakeholders associated with the monitoring and control of environmental impact of the projects. The system dynamics simulation of the evolutionary game indicated problems in sustaining desired behaviour from the concerned stakeholders. Based on the observations from the simulation of the evolutionary game, a penalty – reward system was proposed to deal with these problems and to ensure that execution of projects is pro-environmental with minimum monitoring from the senior management.

Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2020.1870918

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