 What drives acquirers’ myopic marketing management?Chanil Boo and Changhyun Kim Applied Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 29, issue 7, 640-643 Abstract: Acquiring firm managers should allocate marketing investments to maximize synergies from already announced mergers or acquisitions. However, managers may deliberately redistribute marketing capabilities and assets as a response to investor pressure formed by weak stock return around an announcement. We propose that stock returns that are below expectations may create investor pressure, which drives managers to practice myopic marketing management. We present evidence that acquirers are more likely to engage in myopic marketing management when they experience a negative stock market reaction around a merger announcement. Acquirers tend to report lower-than-normal advertising and R&D investments. Empirical results suggest that acquirers use marketing activities as an efficient tool to confront negative stock market evaluation. Our study contributes to the myopic management literature by showing when and how firms in mergers and acquisitions are more likely to exhibit opportunistic managerial behaviour. We provide some policy suggestions for both acquiring firm managers and investors. Date: 2022 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:29:y:2022:i:7:p:640-643 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2021.1883520 Access Statistics for this article Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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