The effect of continuous-time cheap talk in the experimental minimum effort game

Hisashi Toku, Tatsuhiro Shichijo and Kazuhito Ogawa

Applied Economics Letters, 2022, vol. 29, issue 8, 687-699

Abstract: We experimentally investigated whether continuous-time cheap talk improves the effort level in a minimal effort game with multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria. In each round of the game, a player freely changes the message before he or she makes decisions, and constantly monitors other members’ messages. We have two results. First, continuous-time cheap talk realizes a higher effort level than does one-shot cheap talk. Second, the group in which every member chooses the maximum effort in the first two rounds eventually achieves an efficient outcome.

Date: 2022
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2021.1884828 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:29:y:2022:i:8:p:687-699

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2021.1884828

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().