Fund shareholding and corporate inefficiency investment

Xiao Li and Gang Liu

Applied Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 30, issue 13, 1754-1762

Abstract: This study explains the effect of Securities investment funds shareholding (fund shareholding) on corporate inefficient investment. The results show that fund shareholding has an inverted U-shaped effect on inefficient investment, which is reflected on over-investment, but not on under-investment. Moreover, the results are mainly presented with lower corporate information transparency. Finally, it is suggested that fund shareholding proportion should be appropriately raised to promote the healthy development of the capital market. This study is of reference significance for guiding fund shareholding to play a role of ‘market stabilizer’.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2022.2082364

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