A dynamic game model for the study of food safety regulation based on sampling probability and penalty intensity

Lingbo Tan, Yuan Zhou, Yuan Yuan and Jiapeng Liu

Applied Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 30, issue 13, 1780-1783

Abstract: By constructing a dynamic game model, this article explores the ‘optimal regulation’ and the food safety regulatory mechanism to be adopted when the food safety regulatory authority has to implement a certain level of regulation. In the short term, the actual quality of food can be improved by increasing the probability of sampling or the intensity of punishment. However, in the long term, the optimal path is to improve the production technology of sellers. A moderate level of supervision makes regulation more effective, while a threshold level of regulation can reduce welfare.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2022.2082368

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