Where did you get that from? Gender differences in bargaining for gifts and bought goods
David Matthäus and
Peter Schäfer
Applied Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 30, issue 13, 1784-1792
Abstract:
Do men or women bargain more successfully? Existing evidence suggests that men achieve higher economic outcomes from bargaining than women – but the gap is context-specific. The literature predominantly studies one-shot bargaining games in the laboratory, situations in which communication is impossible, or situations in which persons follow a bargaining protocol. In this study, we use data from a TV show to study whether men or women bargain more successfully for trade deals in the field, without a strict protocol, and with free communication. We find that men and women bargain, on average, equally successfully. However, we find that the bargaining outcomes achieved by female sellers depend on the origin of an object. Specifically, women realize higher outcomes for bought objects than for objects they obtained for free, whereas men realize similar outcomes for bought and free objects. In sum, we find evidence that gender differences observed in the laboratory do not necessarily persist in bargaining situations in other settings and can even be inverted, dependent on the framing of the bargaining situation.
Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2022.2083057 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:30:y:2023:i:13:p:1784-1792
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20
DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2022.2083057
Access Statistics for this article
Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips
More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().