Fiscal transfer under tax and infrastructure competition

Xin Han

Applied Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 30, issue 14, 1904-1908

Abstract: Interjurisdictional fiscal transfer is generally divided into special transfer payments and general transfer payments. We analyse the welfare implications of these two types of transfer within the framework of tax and infrastructure competition for capital among jurisdictions. The results show that when the decline rate of marginal productivity of capital is low, special transfer payments generate a higher level of social welfare than the general transfer regime if the fiscal transfer is sufficiently large. However, when the decline rate of marginal productivity is high, general transfer payments always dominate the special transfer regime in terms of welfare.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2022.2083562

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