Multiple large shareholders and controlling shareholders’ related-party M&As

Yanyan Shen, Xiaotong Yang and Bing Zhu

Applied Economics Letters, 2023, vol. 30, issue 3, 397-403

Abstract: This paper examines the impact of a common ownership structure – multiple large shareholders (MLS) – on controlling shareholders’ related-party mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Using a sample of 2,923 Chinese listed firms from 2003 to 2018, we find that firms with MLS are less likely to initiate controlling shareholders’ related-party M&As and if they do, pay lower M&A premium. Further tests show that the impact of MLS on controlling shareholders’ related-party M&As is more prominent when the relative power of other blockholders is stronger, when MLS are of different identity, when corporate governance mechanism is weaker, and when the agency conflicts are more severe. We also find that the presence of MLS is associated with higher related-party M&A performance. Our results imply that MLS monitor the controlling shareholder and improve governance, and hence restrain related-party M&As.

Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2021.1989365 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:30:y:2023:i:3:p:397-403

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2021.1989365

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().