The role of political party in curtailing opportunistic insider sales: Evidence from China

Xinhui Huang, Augustine Tarkom and Lukai Yang

Applied Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 32, issue 18, 2571-2576

Abstract: The unique political system in shaping socio-economic policies in China calls for a detailed exploration of its precise effect on corporate governance. Using the mandatory establishment of a Chinese Communist Party (CCP) branch after 2018 as an exogenous shock, we find that the establishment of a CCP organization reduces opportunistic insider sales. Our paper contributes to the emerging literature on the role government plays in the business environment.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2024.2336175

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