Group size uncertainty in common pool resource dilemmas

Hironori Otsubo

Applied Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 32, issue 1, 73-77

Abstract: This paper extends the common pool resource (CPR) dilemma game (Budescu, Rapoport, and Suleiman 1995; Rapoport and Suleiman 1992) by relaxing the fixed, deterministic group size assumption. How group size uncertainty influences individual and group behavior and outcomes in CPR dilemmas is theoretically investigated. Group size uncertainty is not detrimental to collective interests; it reduces the probability of destroying a CPR.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2023.2257024

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