Endogenous timing with upstream entry

Ryosuke Tsuritani

Applied Economics Letters, 2025, vol. 32, issue 3, 445-448

Abstract: This study considers a successive Cournot oligopoly consisting of two downstream firms, an upstream incumbent, and an upstream entrant. The downstream firms decide whether their timing of setting quantity is early or late. We find that when the fixed cost of entry takes an intermediate value, and the entrant is more efficient than the incumbent, the downstream firms prefer sequential quantity competition because upstream entry reduces input price.

Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13504851.2023.2274375 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:32:y:2025:i:3:p:445-448

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEL20

DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2023.2274375

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics Letters is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics Letters from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().