A test of the public choice theory of economic sanctions

Shane Bonetti

Applied Economics Letters, 1997, vol. 4, issue 12, 729-732

Abstract: Models of the form of sanctions are constructed to test Kaempfer and Lowenbergs' public choice theory of economic sanctions using the Hufbauer, et al. dataset. The key explanatory variable is presanction trade linkage between sender and target. If sanctions are primarily coercive, trade linkage and the propensity to choose trade sanctions should be positively related. If public choice considerations are dominant the propensity to choose trade sanctions should vary inversely with trade linkage. The results presented are consistent with the public choice interpretation.

Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1080/758528716

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