Financing divided governments

Hakan Berument ()

Applied Economics Letters, 1997, vol. 4, issue 6, 369-372

Abstract: This paper finds that when the Congress and Presidency are controlled by the different political parties in the USA the creation of the seigniorage revenue to finance spending is not higher than when those two branches are controlled by the same party. However, the hypothesis that the creation of seigniorage revenue was lower during the period when the country had a fixed exchange rate regime was partially supported.

Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:4:y:1997:i:6:p:369-372

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DOI: 10.1080/135048597355320

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