Financing divided and unified partisan governments

Jac Heckelman

Applied Economics Letters, 1998, vol. 5, issue 12, 789-791

Abstract: By modifying Berument's divided government-optimum financing model to include partisan interests, it is found that when the Democratic party controls both the Congress and Presidency, real monetary base grows at a higher rate than when the Republican party controls both branches. In addition, it is found that monetary base grows at the slowest rate when neither party controls both branches, supporting a gridlock version of divided government.

Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1080/135048598354041

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