Does federal electoral redistricting induce congressional quits? An empirical note
Frank Mixon and
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kamal Upadhyaya ()
Applied Economics Letters, 1998, vol. 5, issue 2, 61-63
The present paper used national data to examine the outcome of political redistricting (in the United States), from the 1982 amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965, on congressional quits (retirements) in the U.S. House of Representatives. Our results suggest that the redistricting efforts created by these 1982 amendments have led to significantly lower retirement rates within the U.S. House. In fact, upon performing various unit root tests for variable stationarity and developing first-difference statistical equations, our results suggest that retirement rates after the passage of the 1982 amendments are approximately 10.5 to 15 percent lower. Such results contradict much of the previous work in the political science field, yet confirm many of the results beiung put forth by public choice scholars.
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