A dynamic and stochastic analysis of decision making in arranged marriages

Amitrajeet Batabyal

Applied Economics Letters, 1999, vol. 6, issue 7, 439-442

Abstract: In a recent paper, Batabyal (Theory and Decision, 1997) has analysed the decision making process in arranged marriages. In particular, Batabyal shows that a marrying agent's optimal policy depends only on the nature of the current marriage proposal, independent of whether there is recall of previous marriage proposals. In this paper, this line of enquiry is continued by focusing on the decision problem faced by a marrying agent who wishes to maximize the probability of getting married to the best possible person. Inter alia, it is shown that this agent's optimal policy calls for waiting a while, and saying yes to the first candidate thereafter.

Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1080/135048599352952

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