Coasean bargaining with nonconvexities

Jason Shogren, Randy Moffett and Michael Margolis ()

Applied Economics Letters, 2002, vol. 9, issue 15, 971-977

Abstract: It is found that nonconvexities do not reduce the overall efficiency of Coasean bargaining in the laboratory. Also, it is observed that most bargainers act in their own constrained self-interest when bargaining over an efficient corner solution relative to the standard baseline case.

Date: 2002
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DOI: 10.1080/13504850210148116

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