Project finance loan spreads and disaggregated political risk

Claudia Girardone and Stuart Snaith

Applied Financial Economics, 2011, vol. 21, issue 23, 1725-1734

Abstract: This article provides novel evidence on project finance loan pricing using economic and disaggregated political risk determinants. As expected, our findings suggest that the presence of loan guarantees and lower levels of aggregate political risk results in cheaper project finance loans. The evidence in support of disaggregated political risk as a pricing determinant is negligible for developed countries, but significant for developing countries. For the latter we find that loan spreads are negatively related to the effectiveness, quality and strength of a country's legal and institutional systems whilst lower levels of government stability and democratic accountability are associated with lower loan spreads. Our results are consistent with a risk allocation approach to project finance deals.

Keywords: project finance; banking; loan pricing; political risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1080/09603107.2011.577006

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