Ownership structure and minority expropriation: the case for multiple blockholders

Mar�a Guti�rrez, Josep Tribó and Beatriz Mariano

Applied Financial Economics, 2012, vol. 22, issue 24, 2075-2083

Abstract: This article investigates minority expropriation in closely-held firms. Using a sample of Spanish firms for the period from 1996 to 2006, we find that firms that are more vulnerable to minority expropriation have blockholders controlling groups with aggregate equity stakes that are far removed from 50%, which is the point that maximizes the chances of expropriation. Moreover, performance improves when the controlling group's stake moves away from the region where expropriation is more likely -- the alignment effect -- and, if within this region, when the number of group members increases -- the bargaining effect .

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/09603107.2012.697119

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