The nested collective lottery that maximizes welfare under consumption interdependence

Wei-Chun Tseng and Waraporn Ngamsomsuke

Applied Economics, 2012, vol. 44, issue 14, 1863-1866

Abstract: We develop a generalized lottery mechanism in this article that allows people to choose to succeed separately while retaining both merits (fairness and options to succeed jointly) of the collective lottery developed by Chen et al . (2010). We use the rationing of hunting permits in the US and Canada as examples to show the applicability of this generalized lottery mechanism.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2011.556582

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