Predation in off-patent drug markets

Laurent Granier and S颡stien Trinquard

Applied Economics, 2012, vol. 44, issue 17, 2171-2186

Abstract: In 2009, Sanofi-Aventis, whose generic subsidiary is Winthrop, merges with the generic firm, Zentiva. This article fills the gap in the theoretical literature concerning mergers in pharmaceutical markets. To prevent generic firms from increasing their market share, some brand-name firms produce generics themselves, called pseudo-generics. We develop a Cournot duopoly model by considering the pseudo-generics production as a mergers' catalyst. We show that a brand-name company always has an incentive to purchase its competitor. The key insight of this article is that the brand-name laboratory can increase its merger gain by producing pseudo-generics beforehand. In some cases, pseudo-generics would not otherwise be produced and this production is then a predatory strategy.

Date: 2012
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Related works:
Working Paper: Predation in Off-Patent Drug Markets (2012)
Working Paper: Predation in Off-Patent Drug Markets (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:44:y:2012:i:17:p:2171-2186

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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2011.562169

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