Information sharing, market competition and antitrust intervention: a lesson from the Italian insurance sector

Paolo Coccorese

Applied Economics, 2012, vol. 44, issue 3, 351-359

Abstract: By means of an application of the Rosse--Panzar methodology, we assess the degree of competition in the Italian car insurance market in order to evaluate the considerable fine that is imposed on 39 companies by the Italian Antitrust Authority (IAA) in 2000 for their supposed anticompetitive behaviour due to a longstanding information exchange through a third independent company. Our results show that this group of firms has earned revenues as if under monopoly or collusive oligopoly conditions, therefore endorsing the decision of IAA.

Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2010.508721

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