Transparent US monetary policy: theory and tests

Marc D. Hayford and Anastasios Malliaris

Applied Economics, 2012, vol. 44, issue 7, 813-824

Abstract: In 1994, the Federal Reserve System moved to a more transparent reporting of monetary policy. This article assesses the impact of monetary policy transparency on uncertainty about future monetary policy using T-bill rate forecast dispersions and ex post forecast errors from the Survey of Professional Forecasters as a proxy for monetary policy uncertainty. The empirical findings confirm that Federal Reserve transparency has reduced the uncertainty about future monetary policy.

Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00036846.2010.524628 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:44:y:2012:i:7:p:813-824

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20

DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2010.524628

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().