Full privatization through controlling rights transfer in China: the extent of its success

Yunxia Bai, Bing-Xuan Lin, Yaping Wang and Liansheng Wu

Applied Economics, 2013, vol. 45, issue 14, 1857-1867

Abstract: This article investigates the effect of the second step of privatization in China, which is full privatization through controlling rights transfer after share issue partial privatization. It finds that fully privatized firms perform worse than state-controlled enterprises. Expropriation by private block shareholders is greater than that by state block shareholders. Furthermore, increase in expropriation is negatively related to performance change. The results suggest that full privatization may not yield the expected efficiency gains in transition economies with weak legal system. They also emphasize the importance of preventing private block shareholders from exploiting minority shareholders in the process of full privatization.

Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00036846.2011.639742 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:45:y:2013:i:14:p:1857-1867

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20

DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2011.639742

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().