Price discrimination and economics journals

David Rosenbaum and Meng-Hua Ye

Applied Economics, 1997, vol. 29, issue 12, 1611-1618

Abstract: An analysis of pricing by economics journal publishers shows that most publishers initially charge libraries and individual subscribers the same price. Over time, however, almost all eventually engage in price discrimination. The few publishers that never price-discriminate seem to be purchasing an explicit non-profit-maximizing pricing strategy. Once discrimination occurs, library prices rise faster than individual subscriber prices. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions.

Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1080/00036849700000037

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