The determinants of tenure on the Federal Reserve Board of Governors: should I stay or should I go?

Michael Ellis () and D. Eric Schansberg

Applied Economics, 2000, vol. 32, issue 2, 231-237

Abstract: This paper examines the quit behaviour of members of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. We find that the probability of a member continuing is lower when the member is an economist, when the member comes to the Board from the private sector, and when their policy views differ from the Board as a whole. In addition, we find evidence that the President can exert influence on the Fed by the power of appointment. And in contrast with what one might expect, we find that salaries on the Board relative to the private sector do not seem to be an important factor in determining the decision to continue service on the Board.

Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1080/000368400322912

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