Grants and cost shifting in outpatient clinics

Robert Rosenman, Tong Li and Dan Friesner

Applied Economics, 2000, vol. 32, issue 7, 835-843

Abstract: Cost shifting for a non-profit, revenue maximizing healthcare provider which faces a constraint that profit must be non-negative is examined, focusing on fixed payment programmes like Medicare. In addition, how grant money affects cost shifting and extend the empirical analysis of cost shifting to outpatient clinics, using data from publicly funded clinics in California is explored. The results are consistent with cost shifting, and indicate that the cause may be that the Medicare payment system cuts revenues more than costs, forcing clinics to subsidize the care of Medicare patients by increasing prices to other patients.

Date: 2000
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/000368400322174 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:v:32:y:2000:i:7:p:835-843

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20

DOI: 10.1080/000368400322174

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().