The power of negative thinking: corruption, perception and willingness to bribe in Ukraine

Inna Cabelkova () and Jan Hanousek

Applied Economics, 2004, vol. 36, issue 4, 383-397

Abstract: This study provides an empirical analysis of the association between corruption perception and the willingness to offer bribes, as well as of the influence of different sources of information on corruption perception in the Ukraine. The higher the perceived corruption in an organization, the more probable it is that a person dealing with that organization will offer a bribe, therefore supporting corruption. Since corruption scandals in Ukraine seldom result in legal action, information about corruption in the mass media might actually encourage people to give bribes. This study found that corruption perception is one of the key factors in giving a bribe and that its positive/negative effects strongly depend on institutions and government policies.

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1080/00036840410001674303

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