Discrimination in matchmaking: evidence from the price policy of a French marriage bureau

Nicolas Vaillant ()

Applied Economics, 2004, vol. 36, issue 7, 723-729

Abstract: This article shows how a matchmaking agency may improve the quality of serious meetings between individuals seeking long-term relationship, thanks to a price discrimination policy. Its filtering is based on objective and official characteristics (sex, age and contract's environment) and on implicit criteria: the few asked characteristics by its clients.

Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0003684042000222098 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:applec:v:36:y:2004:i:7:p:723-729

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RAEC20

DOI: 10.1080/0003684042000222098

Access Statistics for this article

Applied Economics is currently edited by Anita Phillips

More articles in Applied Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().